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Washington (2008) finds that daughters promote liberal voting (at least with respect to women’s issues) 
among U.S. Congress members and attributes this finding to socialization. However, daughters’ 
influence could manifest differently for elite politicians and the general citizenry either due to self-
selection or the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis, which suggests that parents invest differently in male 
and female children depending on their social status. Using nationally-representative data from the 
General Social Survey, this study asks whether biological daughters affect political party identification, 
traditional views of women, or opinions about abortion and teen sex. We find that female offspring 
promote identification with the more conservative Republican Party, but this effect depends on social 
status. There is no evidence that daughters promote liberal views of women and less consistent evidence 
that they influence views of abortion or teen sex. Overall, evidence supports the Trivers-Willard 
Hypothesis, but with a more complex interaction by social status. 
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Previous research finds that daughters make their parents more liberal (Warner 1991; 
Warner and Steel 1999; Oswald and Powdthavee 2006).  Even among members of the U.S. 
Congress, daughters are associated with views more liberal voting (Washington 2008).  
However, results could be misleading because this research faces several methodological 
limitations.  First, several studies include non-biological children (adopted and step-children), 
which could bias results because the sex of non-biological children is not random.  If liberal 
individuals prefer girls over boys, results could be spurious.  Second, most research relies on a 
select sample, limited to either a local sample or a particular group such as U.S. Congress 
members, among whom the effect of daughters could differ.  For both of these reasons, previous 
results could be driven by selection. 
We may expect different results for theoretical results as well.  Evolutionary arguments 
predict that parents will invest differently in male and female children depending on their social 
status.  Congress members, investigated by Washington (2008), are socially and politically elite.  
If evolutionary arguments are correct, it is likely that the behavioral responses of congress 
members to having more daughters would differ from the general public.  Furthermore, while 
evolutionary research has investigated the relationship between sex of children and a variety of 
behaviors (e.g., parental time spent with adolescents [Kanazawa 2001]; financial support for 
college attendance [Steelman and Powell 1991]; wealth bequests [Smith, Kish, and Crawford 
1987]; and spacing of children and breastfeeding [Gaulin and Robbins 1991]), the effect on 
political views has largely been overlooked.   
To address these methodological and theoretical concerns, we exploit the random nature 
of the sex of biological children in the U.S. to investigate the relationship between sex of 
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children and political preferences in the general population using data from the General Social 
Survey.   
 
Theoretical and Empirical Background 
Contact theory suggests that social exposure to individuals of a given group generally 
makes us more sympathetic to the culture, tendencies, needs and so on of said group if that 
interaction takes place in a non-hierarchical context.  Support for this exposure effect on values 
and beliefs has been found in any number of contexts—such as neighborhoods and dorm 
rooms—and across many demographic dimensions—ranging from race to age (Deutsch and 
Collins 1951; Wilner et al. 1955; Caspi 1984; Herek and Capitanio 1996; Desforges et al. 1991; 
Werth and Lord 1992).  The family is no exception to this rule: If we have family members of 
different groups (age, race, gender, and so on), we should, ostensibly, be more favorably 
disposed toward other individuals in those groups.  Likewise, socialization effects aside, we 
should expect that individuals’ incentives are at least somewhat aligned with those in their 
family.  Indeed, on a range of political and social attitudes, within family correlations are high 
(Glass et al. 1986; Niemi et al. 1977).   
For both of these reasons, we might expect that men and women who spend much of 
their lives cohabiting with women—sisters, daughters, and others—should have political views 
that are more in line with those of national political women’s organizations as compared to 
those who do not.  Indeed, several studies before us have found that the more daughters or 
sisters an individual has, the more “progressive” his/her views on women’s issues.  For 
example, some research finds that daughters increase parents’ feminist views (Warner 1991) 
and preference for gender equalizing policies – including work, education, and childcare/leave 
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policies (Warner and Steel 1999).  However, this research is limited by the use of a local sample 
and a blunt measure of presence or absence of daughters as opposed to a finer scale indicating 
the proportion of daughters.    
More recent research by Oswald and Powdthavee (2006) based on the nationally 
representative British Household Panel Survey (1991 to 2004) finds that, other things held 
constant, each additional daughter increases a parent’s intention to vote liberally (for the Labor 
or Liberal Democrat Parties as opposed to the Conservative Party) by about 2 percentage points.  
They exclude those intending to vote for smaller parties, such as the Green or Scottish National 
Party, and those who are undecided.  They argue that daughters make parents subconsciously 
more sympathetic to leftist policies.  However, the data are limited to children who live at 
home, do not include information on those who have left home, and include step-children.  Non-
biological children could drive their results since they are not randomly “assigned” so to speak.  
The same is true for adult children not covered by the household census since there is a slight 
chance they may selectively migrate out of the parental home in response to parental gender 
attitudes.  In other words, their results could be driven by selection: Parents who are more left-
leaning may be more willing to marry into a family with female offspring; left-leaning adults 
may be more likely to adopt girls than right-leaning adults; and female offspring may desire to 
leave the parental household sooner when their parents hold less female-friendly political views.  
Washington (2008) estimates the effect of number of daughters on Congressional voting, 
controlling for total number of children.  She finds that daughters promote liberal voting among 
Senators and members of the House of Representatives and attributes this effect to socialization: 
Daughters make their parents (mostly their fathers) more sensitive to women’s issues, she 
claims. It is unclear, however, whether this effect can be generalized to the general population 
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for both methodological and theoretical reasons.  Methodologically, members of congress are a 
select group and, as in the case of Oswald and Powdthavee, the effect of daughters on 
congressional voting could result from selection.  Namely, Washington (2008:7) gleans her data 
on child gender from the Congressional Directory or, in case of gender-ambiguous names, from 
on-line public biographies or telephone conversations with the member’s office or a newspaper 
in their district.  She therefore examines the sex of children without distinguishing between 
adopted, step, and biological offspring.  (Washington [p. 5] explicitly notes that, of the 828 
congressional representatives for whom she has data, 75 experienced a change in number of 
children from 1997 to 2004 due to birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, or death.)  Here selection 
is an even more direct problem: While the sex of biological offspring may be random, the sex of 
adopted or even step children is most certainly not.  Further, liberal individuals who have 
daughters might spend less time with their families and devote more time to political ascension; 
or they may be particularly motivated to ascend the political ladder as compared to liberal 
individuals who only have sons.  Or, it could be the case that liberal voters tend to elect 
politicians who have daughters while conservative voters are more likely to elect politicians 
who have sons.  Given the extent to which politicians use their families as “props” to send 
signals about their views and character, this seems plausible.  On the other hand, among the 
general citizenry there is no selection gradient to filter out the less-motivated from the super-
motivated in simply expressing their political preferences.  Given stark differences between a 
highly-selected group of politicians and the general population, the effect of daughters on 
political preferences may be very different between the two groups.  (Even if these selection 
arguments do not explain the extant pattern of results, at the very least, they suggest that there 
may be heterogeneous treatment effects even if selection is not at work.)   
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Despite existing evidence (and relevant theory) suggesting that additional daughters 
should lead to more politically liberal attitudes, there is adequate reason for pause.  The 
evidence does not all go in the direction of additional daughters leading to more liberal views.  
For instance, research using national survey data from the National Survey of Families and 
Households found that sons increase the egalitarian views of married women with children ages 
3 to 18 in the home (Katzev, Warner, and Acock 1994).1  Conservative policies—anti-abortion, 
pro-traditional family structure and so on—seem to constrain the freedom of women.  So why 
would parents of daughters want to hem in the life choices of their offspring?  In fact, the rise of 
women’s rights has been attributed elsewhere to the shift from men’s interests in constraining 
their wives in favor of their interests in preventing their daughters from being exploited as 
property (Fernandez 2009).   
In contrast to the argument that women promote liberal political views – maintained in 
much of the existing relevant empirical and theoretical work – if one takes an evolutionary 
perspective, alternative and more complex predictions ensue.  One such counter-argument is the 
Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH), which suggests that parental investment in sons and 
daughters depends on parental status (Trivers 1972; Trivers and Willard 1973).  Specifically, in 
order to maximize reproductive fitness (i.e. number of grandchildren), higher status individuals 
                                                 
1 However, this study focuses on explaining mothers’ perception of marital instability, with 
traditional family roles as a mediator, and it studies the effect of offspring sex on traditional 
gender roles in the family – such as the appropriateness of mothers’ employment, marriage, 
divorce, and cohabitation – rather than opinions about broader gender roles that are more 
relevant to political views and policy. 
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will devote more resources to sons while lower status individuals will favor daughters.  In other 
words, parents with low status should favor females, whose reproductive chances are less risky 
and depend less on external conditions (Hopcroft 2005).  In contrast, parents with high status 
should favor males according to this hypothesis, because their sons will have an advantage in 
competing for mates and should be able to produce more children than high status daughters.  If 
these strategic preferences manifest in political preferences, the TWH would expect daughters 
to produce different political responses depending on parental status.   
Since sons can potentially generate high numbers of grandchildren if they have a 
competitive edge against other men, they may induce preferences for more libertine social 
norms and policies—ones where paternal investment is low and restraints on male fecundity are 
minimal.  Meanwhile, daughters may elicit grandparental preferences for a world in which male 
sexuality is constrained and paternal investment in offspring is greater.  In summary, in contrast 
to much previous research we hypothesize that daughters may increase preference for 
conservative policies in the general population.  In the U.S., because the Republican Party is 
generally more conservative than the Democratic Party with respect to family values as well as 
social and fiscal policies, we predict that daughters will increase parental identification with the 
Republican Party. 
However, according to the TWH, this relationship should be conditional on parental 
social status.  Among low status parents (and the general population in contrast to Congress 
members), more daughters should promote Republican identification.  Among high status 
parents, daughters should yield no effect unless parents have no sons and expect no further 
children (which is difficult to measure, but could shift their strategy to favor daughters).   
To complicate the idea of conservatism, reproductive arguments suggest that women 
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have an interest in constraining male sexuality and increasing paternal investment in children.  
For these reasons, reproductive theory may imply that daughters should be associated with less 
traditional views of women but conservative views of teen sex (consistent with constrained 
sexuality and greater investment in children).  Socialization theory also predicts that daughters 
will reduce traditional views of women, but does not predict a particular relationship between 
daughters and views of teen sex.  Important to note is that whether or not conservative policies 
actually reduce teen sex is not important (and there is adequate evidence that they, in fact, do 
not succeed [Guttmacher Institute 2010]).   
In summary, we hypothesize that parental reproductive investment strategies manifest in 
political views.  In contrast to much previous research we hypothesize that daughters may 
increase some aspects of conservatism among general citizens, but decrease those that hinder 
female reproductive fitness.  Specifically, we predict that daughters will increase parental 
identification with the Republican Party, the more conservative of the two main political parties 
in the U.S.  At the same time, however, daughters should have a different effect on views of 
abortion and traditional gender norms.  Consistent with both socialization and reproductive 
arguments, daughters should be associated with pro-choice views of abortion and less 
traditional gender views.  However, reproductive theory also implies that daughters should 
increase conservative views of teen sex.   
Finally, these relationships should differ by social status according to the TWH so we 
investigate interaction effects by occupational socioeconomic index score.  We also investigate 
potential interaction effects by gender and age.  Socialization explanations for the effect of 
daughters may predict a declining effect with age.  As parents get older, they probably spend 
less time with their children and any socialization effects may have lost potency over time.  
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Alternatively, men may be more susceptible to socialization from daughters because they would 
otherwise have less exposure to women and their interests.  Socialization explanations might 
expect a weaker effect of daughters for women than men.  While the general population is lower 
status than members of congress, the Trivers-Willard hypothesis could equally predict different 
responses to daughters by social status among respondents in the GSS.  Unlike socialization 
theory, reproductive theory suggests the effect of daughters on political views could depend on 
social status.  While sample sizes are adequate for the main analyses, results may be less 
convincing for the interaction analyses due to smaller sample sizes and self-selection into 
occupational status (SEI score). 
To preview our results, our findings contradict those of Washington, supporting the 
TWH that effect of daughters depends on social status.  With or without controls for gender, 
religion, age of eldest biological child, education, marital status, size of city of residence, and 
generation age gap, the proportion of (biological) girls significantly increases Republican Party 
identification in the United States.  However, this effect holds only for high status parents.  In 
addition, we find that daughters are related to more pro-choice abortion attitudes and 
disapproval of teen sex, but these results are less consistent than those for party identification.  
These results are most consistent with but complicate the Trivers-Willard hypothesis. 
 
Data and Methods 
In a society where antenatal sex-selective abortion is rare, the sex of a particular 
biological child is a random variable.  This study uses nationally representative data from the 
1994 General Social Survey (GSS) to estimate the effect of the proportion of daughters on 
political views.  The 1994 GSS is the only year with information about the sex of respondent’s 
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children.  Now more than 15 years old, the 1994 survey remains valid for our analysis because 
the two party system has not changed in the US.  However, there may have been some slight 
changes in the interim, so our findings should be interpreted as valid in 1994.   
To increase internal validity, the sample excludes individuals without children and limits 
analysis to biological children.  The models shown include individuals with biological children 
who may also have non-biological (adopted, step, or cohabiting children) because those with a 
particular party preference also prefer female children or other family members.  While 
excluding individuals with any non-biological children could therefore bias results, regressions 
excluding them yield similar results but often provide less precise estimates.  Regressions 
shown below estimate the effect of having a greater proportion of female biological children 
compared to parents with a lower proportion of daughters (they do not compare parents and 
non-parents).   
The GSS data are cross-sectional, but because the sex of each individual child is 
random, this is a case where one can make causal inference from cross-sectional data.  Ideally, 
we would also like to have data on partisanship before and after the birth of a child to observe 
change over time, but because the sex of biological children is random, we do not anticipate any 
bias due to cross-sectional data.  If we were using daughters as an instrumental variable to 
estimate the effects of partisanship on some other outcome, we would be concerned about the 
exclusion restriction (i.e. that daughters may also be related to the outcome through fitness or 
some factor other than political identification).  However, since we are estimating the “first 
stage” effect only, results have internal validity. 
Another potential concern is that characteristics of the parents may influence the sex 
ratio of their children (e.g., one aspect of the Trivers and Willard 1973 hypothesis suggests that 
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a nutrient rich maternal diet can increase the likelihood of male children), which would make 
child sex non-random.  This is not testable but it would be completely surprising if, indeed, 
political conservatism (or liberalism) led to skewed sex ratios.  Even if this were the case, it 
would be important to document.  That said, given the limited evidence for facultative sex 
selection in humans (individuals changing the sex ratio of their offspring), it would appear to be 
a slim possibility.  Even if we had longitudinal data, it would be impossible to distinguish 
whether political leaning is causing the sex of offspring or whether, as we posit, it is the result, 
since we would need to know the exact timing of the change of political views vis-à-vis the 
pregnancy, knowledge of the sex of the offspring (even if while still in the womb via 
ultrasound) and, ultimately, the birth of the child and any socialization effect she might have on 
her parents.  In other words, while we cannot fully address this potential concern, it is highly 
unlikely.  To help reduce the possibility, we show that results remain unchanged with and 
without controls included and we investigate the relationship between the sex-mix of biological 
children and a variety of measures that are included as controls (see Table S3, Panels B and C).  
We find no relationship, suggesting that sex mix of children is random, at least with respect to 
the control measures.  However, when all other controls are included, we find a small but 
significant relationship between years of education and sex of the first biological child.  The 
causal arrow could go in either direction, with education slightly encouraging first-born males 
or eldest daughters encouraging or enabling parents to gain more education.  Controlling for 
education helps to address this potential non-random relationship. 
If parents have a preference for boy or girl children, the proportion of daughters may be 
related to total number of children.  In fact, Angrist and Evans (1998) and Conley and Glauber 
(2006) have used the sex-mix of children as an instrument for total number of children because 
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parents who have two children of the same sex are more likely to have a third child.  To address 
this concern, we also investigate the relationship between party identification and first-child sex, 
which is unrelated to family size.  In these regressions, we limit the sample to those whose first 
child is biological.   
To further address concern that the proportion of daughters is related to family size, in 
Table S3, Panel A we regress total biological children on daughters.  We do not find a 
relationship between the sex-mix of children or sex of first child and total number of children.  
As a further measure, we also run all regressions using Washington’s approach, which involves 
controlling for the total number of children, and find similar results.  All of these steps reduce 
any concern that family size is related to the sex-mix of children.  Finally, Table S3, Panel B 
shows mean characteristics of individuals in the sample by sex of first child.  Aside from 
proportion daughters (which is expected), none of the differences are significant between those 
who had a boy versus a girl first.  These results are not conclusive but suggest there is not an 
underlying difference driving both sex-mix of biological children and political partisanship. 
 
Measures 
Control variables include gender, religion, age of eldest biological child, generation age 
gap between parent and eldest biological child, education, size of the respondent’s place of 
residence, and marital status,2 all factors that are related to political party identification.  Age is 
                                                 
2 Marital status is a potential confounding factor.  Early work by Morgan et al. (1988) found 
that sons decrease the likelihood of divorce, conditional on total number of offspring.  Research 
by Lundberg and Rose (2003) and Dahl and Moretti (2004) also argues that sons reduce the risk 
of divorce and increase the likelihood that single parents will marry.  Lundberg and Rose (2002, 
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also related to party identification, but is equal to age of eldest biological child plus generation 
age gap, so it drops out of regression models when those controls are included.  Note that the 
sex of biological children is random so the estimated effect would be valid without controlling 
for even these basic characteristics and results are similar without controls.  Female, Protestant, 
and currently married are measured with indicators.  Child age, generation age gap, and 
education are measured in years.  Size of place is measured in (hundred thousand) residents.   
Party identification is measured as an indicator for Democrat or Republican 
identification and also on a scale (called Republican Scale below) from strong Democrat (-3) to 
strong Republican (3) with Independents in the middle (0).  Results presented below hold with 
no controls, controlling for total number of children, and regardless of how party identification 
is measured. 
We also investigate the effect of daughters on traditional views of women and opinions 
about abortion and teen sex.  Views of women are measured using several outcomes and an 
index of 6 indicators of conservative views of women.  “Women should tend home” is a scale 
from 0 to 3 (strongly disagree to strongly agree) that it would be better for everyone if the man 
is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.  “Women 
should help husband” is a similar scale from 0 to 3 that it is more important for a wife to help 
her husband's career than to have one herself.  “Women not political” is an indicator for the 
view that women are not suited for politics.  The index of conservative views is the sum of 
indicators for belief that: women should stay home; women should not work: would not vote for 
                                                                                                                                                            
2004) attribute this to higher leisure time fathers spend with families when they have a son, and 
the higher utility received from those marriages by fathers.  Marital status is controlled in all 
models below but, given endogeneity concerns, results are similar when excluding it.   
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a woman president: women not political; women should help husband (strongly agree or agree 
dummy); and women should tend home (strongly agree or agree dummy) (Cronbach’s α= 0.74).   
Views of abortion are similarly measured using several indicators and an index of pro-
choice views.  “Abortion OK for health” indicates a belief that abortion should be legal if the 
woman’s health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy.  “Abortion OK if poor” indicates 
abortion should be legal if the family has very low income and cannot afford more children.  
“Abortion OK if single” indicates it should be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman 
is single and does not want to marry the man.  The pro-abortion index is the sum of indicators 
that abortion should be okay for: health, poverty, single, strong chance of serious defect in the 
baby, married and does not want more children, and pregnant due to rape (Cronbach’s α= 0.87).  
For views of women and abortion, both the index and individual indicators are regressed 
separately on the sex mix of children to see whether only certain views are related to the 
proportion of daughters.  Finally, “teen sex always wrong” indicates the belief that premarital 
sex in one’s early teens is always wrong, as opposed to almost always wrong, sometimes wrong, 
or not wrong at all. 
 
Results  
 The association between daughters and political identification is illustrated in Figure 1.  
It shows the proportion identifying as Republican or Democrat by proportion of female children 
for a two-child family.  Out of concern about a potential relationship between daughters and 
family size, larger families are not illustrated in the figure, but they are included in the 
regression sample and they show the same general relationship but not necessarily linearly.  
Figure 2 shows the relationship between sex of first child and party identification.  In both 
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figures, daughters are positively related to Republican identification.  Table 1 shows results for 
linear probability models predicting party identification.  Having a higher proportion of 
daughters significantly reduces the likelihood of Democratic identification and significantly 
increases the strength of Republican Party identification.  Compared to those with no daughters, 
parents with all daughters are 14% less likely to identify as a Democrat, whether or not we 
include controls for gender, religion, age of eldest child, generation age gap, education, size of 
place, and marital status.  Parents who had a daughter first are 6% less likely to identify as a 
Democrat. Similarly, parents who had a daughter first are 6% more likely to identify as 
Republican and parents with all daughters are 11% more likely to identify as a Republican than 
parents with no daughters.    
[Table 1 here] 
 When specifying Republican identification as a continuous measure, Republican 
identification for those with all daughters is half a point higher than those with none.  Parents 
whose first child was a girl score a quarter of a point higher than others.  These effects would 
push borderline independents to be Republicans.  Across all three measures, daughters 
significantly strengthen conservative identification.  This relationship holds when controlling 
for total number of children or using an alternative specification of at least one daughter.  
Meanwhile, deploying Washington’s method – that is, estimating the effect of number of 
daughters while controlling for total children – yields similar results, although the effects are 
smaller.  Results are also consistent when excluding non-biological children.  The estimates are 
nearly identical with and without controls included, which supports our contention that sex mix 
of biological children is random.  In summary, regardless of model specification, daughters 
consistently increase conservative party identification in the United States.  
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[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 Table 2 provides effects of daughters on traditional views of women.  Whether 
specifying proportion of daughters, having a girl first, or having at least one daughter, female 
children nearly always have a negative relationship with traditional views, but the effect is never 
significant.   
Table 3 shows results predicting pro-choice abortion and teen sex views.  The proportion 
of daughters significantly increases the likelihood that parents believe teenage sex is always 
wrong.  Effects are positive for pro-choice views of abortion, but do not reach significance at 
the 95% level.  Similarly, parents who have a daughter first are more likely to have pro-choice 
and anti-teen sex views, but these differences are not significantly different from parents who 
have a son first.  Parents with at least one daughter are significantly more likely to report pro-
choice abortion views.  Compared to parents with all sons, parents with at least one daughter are 
6% and 10% more likely to state that abortion should be legal if the woman’s health is 
endangered or if the woman is single and does not want to marry the man, respectively.  These 
parents score significantly higher (0.38 points) on the index of pro-abortion views and are more 
likely to agree that abortion should be legal if the family cannot afford more children (although 
this last effect is only significant at the 90% level).  The presence of daughters therefore seems 
to have a slight liberal effect on pro-choice views and a higher proportion of daughters increases 
conservative views of teen sex. 
 Finally, Table 4 shows interaction effects between daughters and parent’s 
socioeconomic index (SEI) score.  Regressions in Panel A find that, among high SEI parents 
(SEI above 65, which is the 80th percentile in the sample), the proportion of daughters 
significantly reduces Democrat identification and increases Republican identification.  For 
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example, compared to high SEI parents with no daughters, high SEI parents with all daughters 
are 19% more likely to identify as Republican.  Among low SEI parents (SEI score of 65 and 
below), however, the coefficients are much smaller and in the same direction, but there is no 
significant relationship between daughters and party identification.  This suggests that the sex 
mix of children only influences party identification among high SEI parents.  Panel B compares 
the relationship between SEI score and party identification by sex of first child.  Parents who 
had a son first are slightly more likely to identify as Republican for each additional SEI point.  
Parents who had a daughter first show no such relationship.  Results in both Panels A and B are 
similar when including controls (not shown). 
 Thus, consistent with the TWH, Table 4 shows that parental strategic response to the sex 
mix of children is conditional on parental status.  However, the TWH predicted that daughters 
should promote Republican identification most among low status parents.  We only find this 
relationship among high status parents.  Similarly, TWH may suggest that having a son first 
should reduce Republican identification among parents with higher SEI scores and increase it 
for those whose first child was female.  Instead, we find that having a son first makes SEI score 
positively related to Republican identity but having a daughter first produces no association 
between SEI and party identification.  These results are intriguing and could suggest that having 
a daughter first generates a more complex relationship between SEI and party identification, 
given the distinction we discuss above between political party, abortion views, and traditional 
gender norms, for example.  Thus, while the broad pattern is consistent with the TWH 
prediction that effects are conditional on social status, the specific results are less consistent.  
These results could reflect the complexity of political views. 
To test socialization theory, we also investigated interaction effects of daughters with 
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parental sex and age.  In only one case – whether predicting party identification, views of 
women, or beliefs about abortion or teen sex – does the effect of daughters significantly differ 
by gender.  Compared to men, daughters make women less likely to agree that women should 
not be involved in politics.  However, this interaction does not hold when predicting any other 
measures.  In two cases, age significantly moderates the effect of daughters.  Those with any 
daughters are less likely to believe that it is more important for a wife to help her husband's 
career than to have one herself.  But as an individual ages, having any daughters begins to 
increase agreement that a wife should help her husband’s career.  Similarly, the effect of having 
a daughter first on Republican identification turns positive with age.  Despite these few 
moderating effects, in general, the effect of daughters holds regardless of individual sex or age.  
This pattern holds when excluding those with non-biological children.  Thus, the overwhelming 
absence of interaction effects suggests results hold across gender and age.   
 Finally, the above results address party identification.  Voting patterns may differ from 
identification or political views.  Table S4 investigates the effect of daughters on vote in the 
1992 presidential election.  Consistent with the results above, daughters consistently decreased 
the likelihood of voting Democrat (Clinton), although this effect is only significant at the p<0.1 
level in three out of four models.  In model 4, compared to a parent with no daughters, a parent 
with all daughters was 10% less likely to vote for Clinton (p<.05).  In contrast, the proportion 
daughters or having a daughter first is positively associated with voting for Bush, but never 
reaches significance and is only marginally significant in one model.    
 
Discussion 
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Results contradict both Washington (2008) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2006).  If 
daughters affect political views by socializing parents, the effect of daughters should be similar 
for both politicians and general citizens.  On the other hand, if parental investment strategies in 
children (and therefore political interests) depend on social status as predicted by the TWH, 
daughters may increase conservative party identification among the general population but not 
among high status members of congress.  We find support for the latter interpretation and, while 
highly speculative, evidence for at least the plausibility of evolutionary theories of inclusive 
fitness as they relate to sex-specific reproductive strategies.   
While daughters slightly increase the likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party 
(and voting for the presidential candidate affiliated with that party in 1992), this is certainly not 
the only or most important factor predicting party identification.  Our results suggest that sex 
mix of children is one of many factors contributing to party identification.  Furthermore, we 
only investigate the effect of the sex of children, not other members of the household or family.  
The sex mix of a variety of other groups (such as the sibship with whom the respondent was 
reared during his/her formative years) may have important implications for party identification 
as well, but this study is limited to children. 
The general lack of interaction effects by gender or age, especially coupled with 
significant interaction effects by SEI, further contradicts socialization explanations for the effect 
of daughters.  Warner (1991) found different effects of daughters on feminist views for men and 
women in the U.S.  In contrast, our results for daughters’ influence on views of women are not 
significantly different for men and women.  Finally, there is a small amount of evidence that 
daughters are related to anti-teen sex views, which is consistent with the reproductive 
explanation for effects of daughters.  Anti-teen sex views among parents of girls are consistent 
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with efforts to reduce male promiscuity and thus increase the bargaining power of female 
offspring in sex and mating dynamics.   
Pro-choice views are consistent with greater investment in children taken to term and 
greater control and selectivity of reproduction on the part of mothers.  That is, by having the 
option of an abortion, a woman can terminate a pregnancy conceived with a man who shows 
signs of abrogating expectations of paternal investment (be that time or money).  While pro-
choice views are not consistent with reproductive fitness arguments, the limited evidence 
suggesting a relationship between daughters and pro-choice views further supports the idea that 
the sex mix of children influence parents’ political views.  In this case, however, parents seem 
to value the interests of their children (specifically daughters) over increasing their number of 
grandchildren.  Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that daughters promote liberal views 
of women.  This suggests that the effect of daughters on party identification is not mediated by 
an effect on views of women and counters socialization arguments.   
Finally, consistent with the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, results show that the effect of 
daughters on party identification is conditional on occupational status.  However, the specific 
interaction results are slightly different from what the TWH predicts.  While TWH expects 
daughters to increase conservative preferences most among low SEI parents, we find that 
daughters increase Republican identification, but only among high SEI parents.  Similarly, we 
find that having a daughter first produces no association between SEI and party identification, 
while having a son first makes SEI positively related to Republican identity, which is different 
than the relationship implied by the TWH.  Thus, while the broad pattern is consistent with the 
TWH prediction that effects are conditional on social status, the specific results are less 
The Effect of Daughters on Partisanship  
 
 20 
consistent.  Results could complicate the TWH but could equally reflect the complexity of 
political preferences.  
One implication of our findings is that if individuals seek to maximize their chances of 
passing on genes to future generations (“inclusive fitness”), both men and women may desire 
more conservative policies when they have more female genetic kin.  There is an inherent 
conflict between parents that is particularly acute in species that invest heavily in offspring (so-
called K-strategy organisms).  Males’ optimal reproductive strategy is to sire many offspring 
with a range of mates and push the parenting requirements onto the mothers.  Meanwhile, the 
mother seeks to maximize not only the genetic fitness of the sire, but also to induce more post-
conception investment in rearing the offspring from the father.  Seen in this light, more 
conservative policies that increase the cost of promiscuity—particularly for males—will 
enhance the reproductive bargaining power of women.  If individual interests lie in genetic 
endurance, both men and women with more daughters should prefer socially conservative 
policies favored by the Republican Party: an emphasis on family and teen abstinence, which 
stress investment in children.   
Women are certainly not a homogeneous group and have diverse views and priorities. 
However, from a biological point of view, women share reproductive interests.  In short, we 
find that parents of daughters favor the Republican Party.  Evidence suggests this is partly 
because Republican policies support the genetic fitness of women by reducing promiscuity and 
increasing paternal investment in children.  Such policies may impinge on the freedom of 
parents’ immediate offspring, but they increase the expected number of grandchildren via 
daughters.  While evolutionary arguments such as these can often be ad hoc and untestable, we 
think that in this case they merit attention given the pattern of effects our analysis reveals.  We 
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welcome, of course, replication tests of our findings with other datasets that combine 
information on political views with a census of offspring sex just as we hope that others will test 
the Trivers-Willard hypothesis and other sex-specific reproductive strategy arguments using 
other creative approaches. 
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Table 1: Effect of Daughters on Party Identification – Linear Probability Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Democrat Republican Republican Scale 
             
1st Child Female -0.06+  -0.06*  0.06*  0.06*  0.25*  0.26*  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.09)  
% Daughters  -0.14*  -0.14*  0.11*  0.11*  0.51*  0.50* 
  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.21)  (0.19) 
Female   -0.03 -0.04   0.02 0.03   0.07 0.08 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.10) (0.10) 
Protestant   -0.07* -0.06*   0.09* 0.08*   0.26* 0.24* 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.09) (0.08) 
Education in Years   -0.01 -0.01   0.02* 0.02*   0.07+ 0.07 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Married   -0.15** -0.15**   0.12** 0.11**   0.59** 0.59** 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.12) (0.12) 
Size of Place (100k)   0.00 0.00   -0.00** -0.00**   -0.01+ -0.01+ 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Age Eldest Bio Child   -0.00 -0.00   0.00+ 0.00+   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap   -0.00 -0.00   0.01 0.01   0.02 0.02 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.50** 0.54** 0.91** 0.94** 0.37** 0.34** -0.26* -0.27* -0.27** -0.39** -2.33** -2.42** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.49) (0.51) 
             
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 
R-squared 0.004 0.010 0.034 0.040 0.003 0.007 0.052 0.054 0.004 0.008 0.043 0.047 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All models are weighted and limited to those with biological children.  Proportion of daughters excludes non-biological children.  Models predicting 
Republican Scale are traditional OLS not linear probability models.   
Results are similar with other specifications, including at least one daughter and Washington’s approach (estimating the effect of number of daughters 
and controlling for total number of children).  However, number of biological children may be endogenous, so our approach is preferred. 
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Table 2: Effect of Daughters on Traditional Views of Women – Linear Probability Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Women Should Tend Home Women Not Political Women Should Help Husband Conservative Views of Women 
             
% Daughters -0.07   -0.04   0.04   -0.03   
 (0.11)   (0.05)   (0.09)   (0.20)   
1st Child Female  -0.05   -0.02   -0.02   -0.07  
  (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.10)  
At Least 1 Daughter   -0.12   -0.06   -0.08   -0.18 
   (0.10)   (0.04)   (0.09)   (0.13) 
Female -0.18+ -0.19+ -0.19+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.23* -0.23* -0.24* -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Protestant 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.25* 0.25* 0.25* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Education in Years -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.12** -0.12** -0.12** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Married 0.11* 0.11* 0.12* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Size of Place (100k) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Eldest Bio Child 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 1.13** 1.13** 1.18** 0.26+ 0.26+ 0.29+ 0.94** 0.97** 1.01** 1.18* 1.21* 1.28* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43) 
             
Observations 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 
R-squared 0.163 0.163 0.166 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.198 0.198 0.200 0.195 0.196 0.198 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Women Should Tend Home: much better for everyone if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family – 
strongly disagree to strongly agree (0-3) 
Women Not Political: women not suited for politics indicator 
Women Should Help Husband: more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself – strongly disagree to strongly agree (0-3) 
Conservative Views of Women Scale = index of indicators for: women should stay home, women should not work, would not vote for woman president, 
women not political, women help husband, and women tend home; Cronbach’s α= 0.74. These models are traditional OLS not linear probability models.  
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Table 3: Effect of Daughters on Pro-Choice Views of Abortion and Anti-Teen Sex – Linear 
Probability Models 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Abortion OK for Health Abortion OK if Poor Abortion OK if Single 
          
% Daughters 0.06+   0.09   0.09   
 (0.03)   (0.06)   (0.05)   
1st Child Female  0.04+   0.05   0.05  
  (0.02)   (0.06)   (0.03)  
At Least 1 Daughter   0.06*   0.08+   0.10** 
   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.03) 
Female -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Protestant 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education in Years 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Size of Place (100k) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Eldest Bio Child 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.77** 0.78** 0.75** 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
          
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.038 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pro-Abortion Index Teen Sex Always Wrong 
       
% Daughters 0.37   0.11*   
 (0.20)   (0.04)   
1st Child Female  0.22   0.04  
  (0.15)   (0.04)  
At Least 1 Daughter   0.38*   0.12 
   (0.13)   (0.07) 
Female 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.12+ 0.12+ 0.13+ 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Protestant -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Education in Years 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 0.09+ 0.09+ 0.09+ 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Size of Place (100k) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Eldest Bio Child -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 2.63** 2.70** 2.56* 0.74** 0.76** 0.72** 
 (0.78) (0.74) (0.79) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
       
Observations 661 661 661 333 333 333 
R-squared 0.027 0.026 0.030 0.124 0.118 0.132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Abortion OK for Health: abortion should be legal if the woman’s health is seriously endangered by the 
pregnancy 
Abortion OK if Poor: abortion should be legal if the family has very low income and cannot afford more 
children 
Abortion OK if Single: should be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman is single and does not 
want to marry the man 
Pro-Abortion Views: index of abortion should be okay for: health, poverty, single, strong chance of 
serious defect in the baby, married and does not want more children, pregnant due to rape; 
Cronbach’s α= 0.87. These models use traditional OLS rather than linear probability models. 
Teen Sex Always Wrong: premarital sex in early teens is always wrong 
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Table 4: Interaction Effects by Socioeconomic Status 
Panel A: Effect of Daughters on Political Party Identification by SEI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  High SEI   Low SEI  
VARIABLES Democrat  Republican  Repub Scale  Democrat  Republican  Repub Scale  
       
% Daughters -0.31** 0.19** 1.03** -0.09 0.08 0.35 
 (0.069) (0.054) (0.264) (0.064) (0.050) (0.208) 
Constant 0.59** 0.37** -0.43* 0.53** 0.34** -0.38** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.178) (0.027) (0.024) (0.073) 
       
Observations 244 244 244 824 824 824 
R-squared 0.049 0.018 0.031 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
Panel B: Relationship between SEI and Political Party Identification by Sex of First Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 First Child Male First Child Female 
VARIABLES Democrat  Republican  Repub Scale  Democrat  Republican  Repub Scale  
       
SEI Score -0.002 0.004** 0.017** -0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Constant 0.594** 0.162** -1.123** 0.526** 0.341** -0.229 
 (0.049) (0.039) (0.159) (0.073) (0.059) (0.303) 
       
Observations 532 532 532 478 478 478 
R-squared 0.005 0.028 0.025 0.003 0.003 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
The high SEI cutoff is 65, which is approximately the 80th percentile.  Results are similar including controls. 
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Figure 1: Observed Party Identification by Proportion Girls and Sex of First Child 
 


























Party Identification by Sex of First Biological Child
All Family Sizes (N=1051)
Male
Female
 Republican    Republican Scale     Democrat 
 Republican     Republican Scale      Democrat 
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Dev. Min Max 
            
% Daughters 1051 0.47 0.36 0 1 
1st Child Female 1051 0.47 0.50 0 1 
At Least 1 Daughter 1051 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Total Bio Daughters 1051 1.15 1.03 0 7 
Total Bio Children 1051 2.44 1.38 1 9 
Democrat 1051 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Republican 1051 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Republican Scale 1051 -0.18 2.05 -3 3 
Female  1051 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Protestant  1051 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Education (years) 1051 12.92 2.93 0 20 
Married  1051 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Size of Place (100k) 1051 3.09 10.83 0 73.23 
Age Eldest Bio Child 1051 25.04 16.16 0 75 
Generation Age Gap 1051 24.28 5.16 11 52 
Age 1051 49.32 16.20 19 89 
Women Tend Home 634 1.29 0.81 0 3 
Women Not Political 634 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Women Help Husband 634 1.04 0.74 0 3 
Conserv. Views of Women 634 1.20 1.50 0 6 
Abortion OK for Health 661 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Abortion OK if Poor 661 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Abortion OK if Single 661 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Pro-Abortion Views 661 3.81 2.05 0 6 
Teen Sex Always Wrong 333 0.77 0.42 0 1 
The sample excludes those without any biological children or missing values for other measures. 
. 
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Scale Female Protestant 
Education 
(years) Married 






           Republican 1 
         Democrat -0.76* 1 
        Republican Scale 0.89* -0.89* 1 
       Female 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 1 
      Protestant 0.09* -0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 1 
     Education (years) 0.12* -0.07*  0.11* -0.02  -0.12* 1 
    Married 0.12* -0.12* 0.13* -0.20*  -0.02 0.15* 1 
   Size of Place (100k) -0.06* 0.05 -0.07* 0.01 -0.08*        0.05      -0.04 1 
  Age Eldest Bio Child 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.08*  0.17* -0.27* -0.14* -0.03 1 
 Generation Gap Eldest 0.09* -0.06 0.08* -.26* -.14* 0.29* 0.13* -0.01 -.15* 1 
Age 0.08* -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.12* -0.18* -0.10* -0.03 .95* .17* 
* p<.05 
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Table S3: Investigating Family Size, Sex Mix of Children, and Sex of First Child 
Panel A: Family Size by Sex of Children 
VARIABLES Total Biological Children 
 (1) (2)@ (3) (4)@ 
     
% Daughters -0.02 -0.07   
 (0.10) (0.10)   
1st Child Female   0.02 -0.02 
   (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 2.51** 3.07** 2.49** 3.05** 
 (0.08) (0.36) (0.07) (0.35) 
     
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 
R-squared 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.220 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
@Includes controls for: Female; Protestant; Education; Married; Size of Place (in 100,000s); 
Age of Eldest Biological Child; Generation Age Gap 
All models are weighted and exclude individuals with no biological children.   
 
 
Panel B: Mean Comparisons by Sex of First Biological Child 
  Female Male 
Total Bio Children 2.47 2.42 
% Daughters * 0.75 0.23 
Female 0.60 0.64 
Protestant 0.65 0.62 
Education (yrs) 12.84 12.99 
Married 0.62 0.61 
Size of Place (100k) 3.28 2.93 
Age Eldest Bio Child 25.41 24.70 
Generation Gap Eldest 24.34 24.24 
Age 49.75 48.94 
N 492 559 
 
* Indicates a significant difference in means (p<.05).  Only % daughters is 
significantly different by sex of first child. 
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Panel C: Predicted Sex Mix of Children 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 1st Child Female % Daughters 
   
Female -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Protestant 0.03 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Education in Years -0.01* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Size of Place (100k) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Eldest Bio Child 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.50** 0.43** 
 (0.09) (0.06) 
   
Observations 1,051 1,051 
R-squared 0.007 0.010 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table S4: Effect of Daughters on Presidential Vote in 1992 – Linear Probability Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Voted for Clinton Voted for Bush 
         
1st Child Female -0.07+  -0.08+  0.05  0.05  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
% Daughters  -0.10+  -0.10*  0.10  0.11+ 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Female   -0.00 -0.00   0.06* 0.06* 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Protestant   -0.05 -0.05   0.05 0.05 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Education in Years   -0.01 -0.01   0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Married   -0.14** -0.14**   0.11* 0.11** 
   (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Size of Place (100k)   0.01** 0.01**   -0.00** -0.01** 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Eldest Bio Child   -0.00 -0.00   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Generation Age Gap   -0.00 -0.00   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.47** 0.48** 0.79** 0.80** 0.35** 0.33** -0.09 -0.12 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.14) 
         
Observations 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.047 0.047 0.003 0.005 0.035 0.038 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All models are weighted and exclude individuals with no biological children.   
 
